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2 A STUDY OF FINANCIAL MARKETS
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Introduction
Faced with a currency crisis in November 1997,
Korea asked assistance from the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF). On 3 December, the authorities
and IMF agreed on a program amounting to $57 bil-
lion,1  the largest in IMF’s history. The program re-
quired a tight macroeconomic policy as well as com-
prehensive structural adjustment in the corporate and
financial sectors.
Before the crisis, most people believed that Ko-
rean economic fundamentals were sound and that a
foreign exchange crisis was impossible. The country’s
macroeconomic variables and foreign-debt-related
indicators, such as debt-service ratio, suggested that
it would not go the way of Mexico, Thailand, and
other crisis-ridden economies.
Korea’s economic performance had been the envy
of the developing world during the last three decades.
In December 1996, the country became the second
Asian member of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). Its economic
performance during the last five to seven years was
impressive. Average growth rate was about 7-8 per-
cent and inflation was stable at below 5 percent. Un-
employment remained below 3 percent. The country
registered either a fiscal balance or surplus. The only
problem was the current account: after a surplus in
1993, it deteriorated continuously until the deficit
peaked in 1996. However, the deficit was still below
5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and, even
on the eve of the financial crisis, it was decreasing
rapidly. Korea was compared favorably with other
crisis- and debt-ridden countries except for its ratio
of foreign reserves to short-term debt, which started
to fall in 1996. Compared to that of other developing
countries, its foreign-debt/GDP ratio was among the
lowest.
Korea’s sound macroeconomic performance and
debt indicators led most observers to believe that the
country would escape the foreign exchange crisis
that had overwhelmed Indonesia, Mexico, and Thai-
land. The Korean people were shocked when their
Government asked IMF for a bailout program.
Why did Korea find itself in a financial and cur-
rency crisis? The answer lies in the country’s mac-
roeconomic environment and structural problems,
which led to (i) corporate overinvestment, (ii) a highly
vulnerable financial structure, and (iii) banks’ mis-
match of foreign assets and liabilities. This paper
analyzes not only macroeconomic policies before and
during the crisis, but also structural problems and the
development of the corporate financial structure, all
of which led to the crisis.
Overinvestment in the corporate sector, which was
financed largely by short-term debt, led to corporate
insolvency, which, in turn, rapidly increased banks’
nonperforming assets. It was facilitated by economic
liberalization, which started in the 1990s under the old
rules of the game—that is, that the Government would
implicitly guarantee domestic as well as foreign loans
and would not allow the chaebol (conglomerates) to
go bankrupt.2  The combined effect of relaxation of
(i) restrictions on foreign loans, (ii) entry of financial
institutions, and (iii) Government control over firms’
entry into specific industries led to rapid investment
expansion in 1994-1996 despite the corporate sector’s
declining profitability. The start of the domestic reces-
sion in late 1995 and  severe terms-of-trade shock in
1996 aggravated the cash flow situation of highly le-
veraged firms, which already suffered from high
wages, high interest rates, and low profits. The accu-
mulated impacts pushed longstanding corporate sec-
tor problems to the surface, starting a chain of chaebol
bankruptcies in early 1997.
As the Government could no longer afford to bail
out the chaebol, and as Korean banks watched their
nonperforming assets grow, foreign creditors re-
viewed the risk of lending to Korean banks and firms.
Foreign creditors’ and investors’ confidence in the
economy eroded rapidly as the Asian financial crisis
broke out and it became clear that Government policy
response to the crisis was flawed. Poor supervision
contributed to the growing term mismatch between
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banks’ foreign assets and liabilities during capital lib-
eralization, making the economy extremely vulner-
able to runs by foreign creditors, which were trig-
gered by the contagion in neighboring countries.
The paper is organized as follows. The next sec-
tion discusses (i) developments in the macroeconomic
environment, (ii) structural problems, (iii) corporate
financial structure, and (iv) foreign debt structure in
light of economic liberalization in the 1990s. The third
section reviews macroeconomic policy management
in the midst of globalization and the crisis, and ana-
lyzes mistakes in policy response. The fourth assesses
the IMF program. The fifth specifies the challenges
facing the economy and recommends policies. The
sixth summarizes lessons from the financial and cur-
rency crisis.
Macroeconomic
Developments and
Economic Liberalization
Government intervention in resource allocation has
been more pervasive in Korea than in other East
Asian market economies. The country’s rapid eco-
nomic development during the last four decades has
been based on a close partnership between Govern-
ment and industry.3  The Government spurred do-
mestic entrepreneurs with cheap credit, export in-
centives, and other measures to draw their invest-
ments into the export, heavy, and chemical indus-
tries, establishing a kind of Government-business-in-
dustry co-insurance relationship. Until the early 1980s,
the Government directly owned all major commer-
cial banks, controlling their management and credit
allocation even after they were privatized. Firms in
trouble due to their overly ambitious investments or
external shocks were saved by Government bailout
credit and other measures to socialize their losses.
When they were successful, they were allowed to
keep their profits and expand rapidly. The chaebol
moved into almost every industry, from semiconduc-
tors and automobile manufacturing to the hotel and
retail business.4  The top 30 chaebol represented al-
most half of total corporate assets and 14 percent of
total employment.
Rapid economic growth and changes in both the
domestic and international economic environment in
the 1990s prompted economic, especially financial,
liberalization. Financial liberalization had been at-
tempted since the early 1980s, but did not progress
for various reasons.5   However, starting in 1993, it
made headway domestically and internationally. In-
terest rates were almost completely liberalized and
entry barriers to the banking and nonbanking sectors
relaxed. (See Appendix.) Most restrictions on for-
eign capital flows were also removed. Although the
Government continued to restrict foreign investment
in domestic fixed-income assets, such as Govern-
ment securities and corporate bonds issued by large
firms, it quickly relaxed the restriction on foreign in-
vestment in the domestic stock market and on short-
term trade-related credit.
It is notable that the Government quickly liberal-
ized the foreign exchange business and foreign bor-
rowing of domestic banks while controlling firms’
direct foreign borrowing. This allowed rapid expan-
sion of foreign debt channeled through the domestic
banking system and, to a lesser extent, through di-
rect borrowing of firms starting in 1994 (Table 1).
Macroeconomic Developments
Economic and financial liberalization did not cause
significant macroeconomic imbalance, because the
Government maintained prudent fiscal and monetary
control and pursued a cautious approach to capital
market opening.
The macroeconomic environment was stable
throughout the 1990s. Economic growth rate was
high, especially in 1994-1996, averaging at 8 percent
(Table 2). Inflation was steady at about 5 percent.
The domestic interest rate was high due to strong
investment demand by firms, but gradually declining.
Fiscal and monetary policies were also sound. Mon-
etary policy was reasonably stable, although some-
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what expansionary when measured by the growth
of M3, which was not subject to control by the mon-
etary authorities. Monetary growth rate further sta-
bilized beginning in 1994 despite continued expan-
sionary pressure from increased foreign capital in-
flow. The consolidated budget has produced a sur-
plus since 1993.
The only imbalance was in the current account
position. The country had a current account deficit
throughout the 1990s, except in 1993, and this ex-
I tem
Total external debtb
   Long-term
   Short-term
Public sector
   Long-term
   Short-term
Private sector
   Long-term
   Short-term
Financial sector
   Long-term
   Short-term
Total foreign obligationc
   Long-term
   Short-term
Public sector
   Long-term
   Short-term
Private sector
   Long-term
   Short-term
Financial sector
   Long-term
   Short-term
Table 1: External Debt, 1992-1997 ($ billion)
a Preliminary.
b World Bank standard of classification of external debt, which includes domestic residents’ debt  only.
c World Bank standard plus financial institutions’ offshore borrowing and foreign branches’  borrowing.
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy, Financial Statistics Bulletin, various issues.
1992
42.8
24.3
18.5
5.6
5.6
0
13.7
6.5
7.2
23.5
12.2
11.3
62.9
26.0
37.0
5.6
5.6
0
13.7
6.5
7.2
43.6
13.9
29.8
1993
43.9
24.7
19.2
3.8
 3.8
 0
15.6
7.8
7.8
24.4
13.0
11.4
67.0
26.7
40.3
3.8
 3.8
0
15.6
7.8
7.8
47.5
15.0
32.5
1994
56.8
26.5
30.4
3.6
 3.6
0
20.0
9.0
11.0
33.3
13.9
19.4
88.7
30.3
58.4
3.6
3.6
0
20.0
9.0
11.0
65.1
17.7
47.4
1995
78.4
33.1
45.3
3.0
3.0
0
26.1
10.5
15.6
49.3
19.6
29.7
119.7
41.0
78.7
3.0
3.0
0
26.1
10.5
15.6
90.5
27.5
63.1
1996
104.7
43.7
61.0
2.4
2.4
0
35.6
13.6
22.0
66.7
27.7
39.0
157.5
57.5
100.0
2.4
2.4
0
35.6
13.6
22.0
119.5
41.5
78.0
1997a
120.8
69.6
51.2
18.0
18.0
0
42.3
17.6
24.7
60.5
33.9
26.6
154.4
86.0
68.5
18.0
18.0
0
42.3
17.6
24.7
94.1
50.3
43.8
I tem
GDP growth rate
Inflation (CPI)
Corporate bond yield rate
Money supply (M2) growth
Money supply (M3) growth
Fiscal deficita/GDP
Current account/GDP
Foreign exchange reserves ($ billion)
Table 2: Macroeconomic Indicators, 1980-1996 (percent)
( ) = negative values are enclosed in parentheses.
a IMF consolidated fiscal deficit.
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy, Financial Statistics Bulletin, various issues.
1980-
1985
6.3
10.9
19.0
20.6
25.0
(2.5)
(3.8)
7.1
1986-
1991
9.9
6.1
15.1
18.8
28.7
(0.2)
3.0
12.2
1992
5.1
6.3
16.2
18.4
21.8
(0.7)
(1.5)
17.1
1993
5.8
4.8
12.6
18.6
19.0
0.3
0.1
20.3
1994
8.6
6.2
12.9
15.6
24.7
0.5
(1.2)
25.7
1995
8.9
4.5
13.8
15.5
19.1
0.4
(2.0)
32.7
1996
7.1
4.9
11.9
16.2
16.7
0.3
(4.9)
33.2
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panded in 1995-1996 (Table 3). Nevertheless, offi-
cial foreign reserves increased owing to large capi-
tal inflow.
The current account deficit expanded for several
reasons:
• Private sector investment quickly increased.
• Trade shock ensued with the collapse of the in-
ternational semiconductor market and decline of
international prices of major export items, such
as steel, ships, and petrochemical products. It
was the greatest trade shock after the first oil
shock, surpassing even the second oil shock.
• The won appreciated in real terms due to the
yen’s depreciation (Table 4). Unlike many other
East Asian countries, Korea adopted the rela-
tively flexible market average exchange rate
system in 1990. Nevertheless, the yen’s depre-
ciation lowered Korean exports’ competitiveness
in 1995-1996, contributing to further widening of
the current account deficit.
The expansion of the current account deficit and
the opening of the capital market rapidly raised for-
eign debt in the 1990s. Such increase was facilitated
by short-term capital inflow, especially in 1993-1996
when capital market opening accelerated (Figure 1).
Structural Problems
Despite a stable macroeconomic environment, struc-
tural problems intensified and became more obvious
as the economy increasingly opened in the 1990s.
These problems lay in the distorted incentive struc-
ture, which (i) encouraged overexpansion of corpo-
rate investment and (ii) misaligned relative prices,
especially the overvalued exchange rate, which (a)
distorted resource allocation and (b) reduced export
competitiveness. Furthermore, political democratiza-
tion strengthened the bargaining power of labor
unions and rapidly raised real wages. The bubble
effect of real property increased rents and the price
of services. In addition, in a situation where asset
values, rents, and exchange rates were misaligned,
the chaebol expanded their social influence by in-
creasing in size rather than by investing profitably
Figure 1: Foreign Debt
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy, Financial Statistics Bulletin, various issues.
I tem
Current account
Capital account
Overall balance
Foreign reserves
Table 3: Trend of Foreign Exchange Supply and
Demand, 1994-1997 ($ billion)
( ) = negative values are enclosed in parentheses.
Source: Bank of  Korea, Monthly Bulletin, various issues.
1994
(4.5)
9.0
2.8
25.7
1995
(8.9)
13.4
3.0
32.7
1996
(23.7)
17.0
(5.7)
33.2
1997
(12.5)
10.2
(8.6)
24.4
Export price index
Import price index
Terms of trade
Savings (% of GDP)
Investment (% of GDP)
Real exchange rate (W/¥; 1993=100)
Real exchange rate (W/$; 1993=100)
Table 4: Terms of Trade and Real Exchange Rate, 1991-1997
Source: Bank of  Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various issues.
1991
94.2
96.4
97.7
36.1
39.1
90.9
98.4
1992
93.2
94.9
98.2
35.0
36.8
91.6
100.5
1993
93.6
91.3
102.5
35.2
35.2
100.0
100.0
1994
95.2
91.8
103.7
35.4
36.2
104.3
95.0
1995
100.0
100.0
100.0
36.2
37.4
94.7
91.3
1996
86.6
98.8
87.7
34.6
38.6
87.9
98.3
1997
75.0
93.4
80.3
36.4
33.3
92.6
101.3
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and efficiently. This was why high interest rates per-
sisted and wages rose faster than productivity. Poor
prudential regulation and supervision failed to curb
financial institutions’ reckless lending to risky corpo-
rate investments.
Rapid Wage Increase
Domestic wages grew faster than labor productivity
during the last decade (Table 5),  making them higher
than those of Hong Kong, China; Singapore; and
Taipei,China (Table 6).
As a result, the corporate sector increasingly suf-
fered from declining competitiveness and profits.6
By the early 1990s, high wages began to take their
toll and most exporting companies began to incur
operational deficits.
Asset Inflation
The ratio of total land value to GDP soared to 9.2 in
1991. Although it gradually went down to 5.4 by 1994
owing to the accelerated growth of nominal GDP rela-
tive to stable land values since 1991, it was still high
compared to other countries’ ratios (Table 7). This
resulted in high rental cost, rental income, and cost of
living, which led urban workers to demand wage hikes.
Rising real estate prices meant that corporations’
asset values increased more quickly than their op-
erational sales deficits, allowing them to continue
borrowing more money. This was supported by the
rapid expansion of credit, especially by the nonbanking
institutions. Therefore, in spite of deficits of many
years, corporations were able to sustain investment
expansion without significantly raising the debt/eq-
uity ratio on their balance sheets.7
Misguided Corporate Incentives and
Erosion of Corporate Profitability
The chaebol expanded their sales, assets, employ-
ment, and, consequently, their social influence.  Al-
though they had low marginal productivity of capital,
their investment drive continued, motivated by rivalry
among themselves for every major industry (includ-
ing automobiles, steel, shipbuilding, retail, and petro-
chemicals). High interest rates persisted despite the
high domestic savings rate because of the strong
demand for capital. Likewise, increased demand for
labor resulted in high wages, while the excessive
activities of chaebol trade unions and the political
democratization of the past 10 years perpetuated the
high wage structure.
On the supply side, financial institutions’ unimpeded
credit support to the chaebol and their affiliated com-
I tem
Wage growth
Productivity growth
Table 5:  Wage and Labor Productivity Increase
(percent)
Source: Korea Productivity Center Estimates.
1971-1986
21.2
26.8
1987-1995
16.1
13.1
Table 6: Hourly Wage in the Manufacturing Sector and Per Capita Income ($)
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1995.
I tem
Hourly Wage:
1985
1990
1995
Per Capita Income:
1995
Hong Kong, China
1.73
3.20
4.82
22,990
Japan
6.34
12.80
23.66
 39,640
Korea
1.23
3.71
7.40
9,700
Singapore
2.47
3.78
7.28
26,730
Taipei,China
1.50
3.93
5.82
12,293
United States
13.01
14.91
17.20
26,980
Country Total Land Value/GDP
Francea 0.9
Japan 3.5
Korea 5.4
United Kingdom 1.6
United States 0.7
Taipei,China 3.3
Table 7: Land Value to GDP Ratio, 1994
a
  Figures  are for 1993.
Source: National Statistical Office.
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panies encouraged the bubble effect. Monetary policy
concentrated on controlling the growth of M2, which
increased by only 5.4 times in the past 10 years, while
nominal GDP increased by 4.4 times. However, an-
other monetary indicator of the market’s total liquid-
ity, M3, grew about 10-fold (Table 8). Over the last
10 years, credit expanded rapidly through merchant
banks and investment trusts, helping create the eco-
nomic bubble.
With wages higher than labor productivity and in-
terest rates higher than capital productivity over the
past 10 years, companies were unable to accumu-
late profit.  From the 1960s to the early 1980s, the
Government controlled the financial industry and la-
bor activities, keeping interest rates and wages be-
low the real rate of return on capital and productivity
increase. Thus, companies’ profits were not fully dis-
tributed to households, but were plowed back into
the companies’ rapidly expanding operations. This
was a major reason for the unprecedented growth
of Korean firms, especially the large ones.
From the second half of the 1980s, however, this
trend was reversed and households’ and individuals’
income support (through high interest rates and high
wages) surpassed companies’ real value of produc-
tion.  Despite higher individual and household income
and consumption, profitability dropped. Operational
deficits were sustained by debt expansion made pos-
sible by (i) increases in the value of corporate as-
sets, (ii) expansion of nonbank financial institution
(NBFI) credits, and (iii) accounting practices that
disguised real losses.
Korean companies’ profitability has deteriorated
to a level much below that of firms in economies
that have significantly lower financial costs, such
as Japan; Taipei,China;  and the US (Table 9). But
real profitability, disguised by accounting practices,
may have been much lower than the statistics sug-
gest.
The chaebol have used their monopolistic position
to transfer their costs, including high wages, interest
rates, and rents, to consumers. However, with the
launching of the World Trade Organization (WTO),
import liberalization has made it harder to pass on costs
to consumers, thus worsening the chaebol’s losses.
Exchange Rate Overvaluation
and Resource Shift Toward the
Nontradable Sector
Despite the monetary authorities’ sterilization efforts,
the real exchange rate appreciated in 1995-1996 due
to capital market opening and massive capital inflow.
Real exchange rate appreciation could have been
higher during the last decade, if adjusted further for
unit labor cost.
The export sector suffered from low receipts and
high factor costs while the nontraded sector had high
Table 9: Corporate Profitability in Manufacturing, 1989-1993 ( %)
na = not available.
a Net profit/sales.
b Operating profit/assets.
Source: Bank of Korea, Corporate Financial Statement Analysis, various issues.
I tem
Current profit/sales
Current profit/assets
Net profit/capital
Japan
3.38
3.54
na
Korea
1.97
1.99
5.03
Taipei,China
3.72
3.50
11.77
United States
3.06a
6.23b
na
I tem
Nominal GNP
M2
M3a
CPI  (1985=100)
Land value (1985=100)
Table 8: Asset Inflation and Monetary Growth,
1985 and 1995 (W billion)
CPI = consumer price index.
a M2 plus liabilities of nonbank financial institutions.
Sources: National Statistical Office; Bank of Korea, Monthly Bulletin, various issues.
1985 (A)
79,301
28,565
55,450
100
100
1995 (B)
348,284
153,945
527,017
176
510
B/A
4.4
5.4
9.5
1.8
5.1
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profitability despite low technology. As a result, re-
sources have moved rapidly from the export sector
to production for the domestic market and from the
trade to nontraded sector. The manufacturing sec-
tor, which once sustained the Korean economy, has
become less important: its share of industry value-
added dropped from 29.2 percent in 1990 to 26.9
percent in 1995. The service sector, however, con-
tinued to expand rapidly to 56 percent. The number
of workers in manufacturing decreased while that in
services, especially the wholesale, retail, and enter-
tainment business, increased swiftly.
These trends are altogether too rapid for an
economy such as Korea. As of November 1996, the
number of workers in the wholesale, retail, and res-
taurant and hotel businesses accounted for 28 per-
cent of the workforce, 7 percent higher than that of
manufacturing (Figure 2). In contrast, Germany; Ja-
pan; Singapore; and Taipei,China have more work-
ers in manufacturing (Table 10).
Seven of the largest chaebol went bankrupt in 1997
after longstanding corporate problems were brought
to the surface by the following: (i) the recession,
which started in late 1995; (ii) the terms-of-trade
shock of 1996; (iii) the reckless investment drive in
1993-1995; and (iv) reduced credit expansion start-
ing in 1995-1996. Banks’ nonperforming loans also
quickly eroded foreign creditors’ confidence.
Financial Liberalization and
the Development of Corporate
Financial Structure
Complete liberalization of domestic interest rates and
the rapid expansion of NBFIs, whose main business
was short-term bill transactions, resulted in the dete-
rioration of the corporate sector’s financial struc-
ture.  This led firms to rely on short-term debt, which
made them increasingly vulnerable to liquidity shock.
Financial liberalization in the 1990s further accel-
erated the growth of the financial sector, which had
developed rapidly in the 1980s owing to stable infla-
tion and high real interest rates. The financial inter-
relation ratio increased from 442 percent in 1991 to
555 percent in 1996.  M3 grew from 114 percent of
GDP in 1991 to 159 percent of GDP  in 1996, help-
ing finance the fast expansion of corporate invest-
ment in the 1990s (Table 11).
Investment went up rapidly in 1995-1996 due to
the following:
• The yen appreciated steeply beginning in late
1993, benefiting Korean industrialists.
• After the Government announced its intention
to join the OECD in 1994, the expectation of
further financial opening and the resulting de-
Figure 2: Employment Share of Manufacturing
Sector
Source: National Statistical Office.
Table 10: International Comparison of Manufacturing Share in Total Employment (%)
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy, Financial Statistics Bulletin, various issues.
I tem
Manufacturing
Wholesale, retail, hotel and restaurant businesses
Japan
(1994)
23.2
22.4
Germany
(1994)
28.7
15.1
Korea
(1996.11)
21.0
28.0
Singapore
(1994)
27.0
22.8
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cline in domestic interest rates encouraged do-
mestic firms’ heavy investment in production
capacity. The gap between domestic and for-
eign interest rates gradually narrowed starting in
1992 (Figure 3).
Prior to economic deregulation, the Government
controlled firms’ entry into industries it deemed
crowded. This checked, to some extent, reckless in-
vestment and buildup of overcapacity caused by the
moral-hazard effect of the Government’s implicit risk
partnership and strong rivalry among the chaebol.8
But economic deregulation under the previous ad-
ministration (1993-1998) stopped Government inter-
vention. When the Government brought down entry
barriers, it should have controlled the chaebol’s reck-
less investment. For instance, it should have limited
cross subsidization among affiliated firms within the
chaebol through cross-guarantee of loans and trans-
fer pricing, and it should have given clearer signals
that it would no longer bail out troubled firms. But it
was only after the crisis broke out and the IMF pro-
gram was negotiated that the Government moved to
rein in the chaebol.
Investment expansion in the 1990s, especially in
1994-1996, relied heavily on short-term financing.
Table 12 shows the financing pattern of the 30 larg-
est chaebol in 1994-1996: they were largely depen-
dent on debt, particulary short-term debt for financ-
ing their investment, which rapidly increased their
short-term liability. This practice was not limited to
the chaebol, but was common in the corporate sec-
tor (Kim 1998).
Table 13 shows the sources of funding for the
corporate sector. Much of the increase in short-
term financing was due to the accelerated growth
of the commercial paper (CP) market. This market
expanded rapidly when the Government deregulated
it in 1994 by (i) removing administrative controls on
its yield, (ii) reducing the minimum unit amount,
and (iii) allowing it to offer a higher interest rate
than bank deposits. The CP market also grew fast
because it was not subject to monetary control.9
Another important factor was regulatory oversight.
CP  was issued by large firms, discounted by short-
FIR
M3/GDP
Table 11: Financial Interrelation Ratio (FIR) and M3/GDP Ratio (%)
FIR = Increase in financial assets/Increase in capital stock, GDP = gross domestic product.
Source: Bank of Korea, Flow of Funds, various issues.
1975
271
39
1980
308
49
1985
394
70
1990
433
111
1994
512
146
1995
526
151
1996
555
159
1991
442
114
1992
467
125
1993
490
134
Table 12:   Financing Pattern of the 30 Largest Chaebol, 1994-1996 (%)
Source: The Korea Center for Free Enterprise, 1997.
1994
1995
1996
Internal Fund
41.2
36.8
22.4
Total
58.8
63.2
77.6
Capital Increase
1.2
1.4
1.3
Long-term Loans
9.8
12.2
12.7
Short-term Loans
47.7
49.7
63.6
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
External Fund
Figure 3: Domestic and Foreign Interest Rate Gap
LIBOR = London interbank offered rate.
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy, Financial Statistics Bulletin, various issues.
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Capital Market Opening and the
Increased Term Mismatch
Capital market opening accelerated beginning in
1994. The Government, however, feared that with
the large gap between domestic and international in-
terest rates, opening the capital market quickly would
destabilize the domestic macroeconomic environment.
It thus employed a gradual approach, liberalizing real
transaction-based flows, such as short-term trade
credit, first, and then pure portfolio transactions later.
This strategy was to guard the economy against vola-
tile movement of portfolio investment, especially
speculative short-term flows involving domestic se-
curities investment. But it gradually opened the do-
mestic stock market to foreign investment in 1993
while restricting foreign investment in domestic fixed-
income assets.10
Aware of domestic firms’ strong appetite for capi-
tal, the Government continued to control their direct
borrowing from abroad. But it was more lax with
domestic banks and allowed the proliferation of li-
censed financial institutions, which could engage in
foreign exchange transactions. In 1994-1996, it per-
mitted the conversion of 24 short-term finance com-
panies, which were prohibited from undertaking for-
eign exchange transactions, into merchant banks,
which could engage in such activities. During the
same period, 28 foreign branches of domestic banks
were established.
The new merchant banks, although lacking expe-
rience in foreign capital transactions, immediately
Table 13: Funds Raised by the Corporate Sector, 1994-1997 (W billion)
1994 1995 1996 Jan-Jun 1997
Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount %
Total funds raised 89,041 100.0 100,016 100.0 118,201 100.0 62.101 100.0
Borrowing from banks and NBFIs 39,650 44.5 31,855 31.8 36,995 31.3 29,755 47.9
Direct finance 33,940 38.1 48,071 48.1 55,601 47.0 19,161 30.9
Commercial  paper (CP) 4,405 4.9 16,096 16.1 20,691 17.5 5,277 8.5
Borrowings from abroad 4,407 4.9 8,392 8.4 12,063 10.2 5,732 9.2
Othersa 11,044 12.4 11,699 11.7 13,542 11.5 7,453 12.0
NBFI = nonbank financial institution.
aTrade credits, borrowings from Government, bills payable, etc.
Source: Bank of Korea, Quarterly Economic Review, various issues.
term finance companies or merchant banks and
resold to other holders with guarantees. Guarantee
of CP was against the rules, but the practice went
unchecked by the regulatory authorities. CP was a
risky asset but it was traded with high yields as if it
were risk-free. The market expectation (i.e., moral
hazard) that the Government would not allow the
chaebol to go bankrupt also contributed to the CP
market’s rapid expansion.
Liberalization of interest rate controls opened the
floodgates for rapid expansion of the short-term se-
curities market. But the failure of the market and
the authorities to institute proper supervisory and
monitoring mechanisms increased overall risk. Fast
growth of the short-term securities market may have
been desirable, but in the absence of proper super-
vision, the market participants were subject to moral
hazard.
The corporate financial sector became weaker.
Its short-term liabilities and leverage ratio rose as it
invested in heavy and chemical industries, which re-
quired a long gestation period. Corporate profits de-
clined due to (i) overexpansion, (ii) high labor cost,
and (iii) high interest payments. Poor financial struc-
ture and profitability and  domestic economic reces-
sion resulted in a chain of chaebol bankruptcies in
early 1997. Financial liberalization, coupled with the
market’s inability to assess risk and monitor invest-
ment behavior, led to overinvestment, which was fi-
nanced heavily through short-term debt. As a result,
firms became vulnerable to liquidity shock.
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higher share of short-term debt than Korea. But the
real problem was the growing term mismatch be-
tween Korean banks’ foreign liabilities and assets,
which started to worsen in 1994 (Table 15). This
was most pronounced for merchant banks.
Recognizing the risk from such mismatch, foreign
creditors demanded higher premiums on Korean
banks’ borrowing rate in early 1997 (Figure 5). Nev-
ertheless, the mismatch problem remained unchecked
by the regulatory authorities. It was only in June 1997
Figure 4: Foreign Borrowing of Banks
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various issues.
I tem 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Share in External Debt
     Long-term debt 56.0 56.8 56.3 46.6 42.2 41.7 42.4
     Short-term debt 44.0 43.2 43.7 53.4 57.8 58.3 57.6
Percent Change
     Long-term debt 25.9 11.0 1.6 7.3 24.9 32.0 17.2
     Short-term debt 20.3 7.6 3.8 58.3 49.0 34.7 14.1
Table 14: Long- and Short-term External Debt, 1991-1997 (%)
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy,  Financial Statistics Bulletin, various issues.
I tem 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Banks
Short-term foreign debt (A) 45.8 49.8 65.8 85.8 104.8
Short-term foreign assets (B) 39.0 44.5 54.9 68.6 84.1
Ratio (%): (B)/(A) 85.2 89.3 83.4 80.0 80.3
Merchant banks
Short-term borrowing (A) 3.3 3.6 5.1 7.1 12.6
Short-term investment (B) 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.8
Ratio (%): (B)/(A) 3.6 4.0 3.0 3.1 6.3
Table 15: Term Mismatch in Foreign Assets and Foreign Liabilities, 1992-1996 ($ billion)
Source: Bank of Korea, Monthly Bulletin, various issues.
Figure 5: Interest Rate Spread of the Korean
Banks’ Borrowing
Source: Bank of Korea, Monthly Bulletin, various issues.
expanded their foreign borrowing (Figure 4). This
and the widening current account deficit in 1994-
1996 led to a rapid increase in foreign debt.
Foreign debt more than doubled in 1992-1996, with
the greatest increase in 1994-1996, at an average
annual growth rate of about 30 percent. Such growth
is mainly due to short-term loans (Table 14).
The rising share of short-term debt may not nec-
essarily have been bad, since it may reflect the deep-
ening integration of the domestic into the global fi-
nancial market. Most advanced economies have a
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that the authorities introduced a rule which limited
holdings of long-term assets through short-term bor-
rowing.
In sum, the capital-opening strategy and lack of
prudential regulations governing banks made the
economy increasingly vulnerable to a foreign ex-
change crisis.
Macroeconomic Policy
Management
A Brief Assessment of the
Degree of Globalization
In the 1990s, the economy was quickly integrated into
the global economy. Former President Kim’s admin-
istration (1993-1998) campaigned intensely for “glo-
balization.” The campaign went beyond economic glo-
balization—it accelerated capital market opening and
other economic deregulation measures. The country’s
intention to join the OECD also facilitated globaliza-
tion. Consequently, domestic financial markets became
more accessible to foreign financial institutions. The
accelerated capital market opening contributed to nar-
rowing the gap between domestic and foreign interest
rates, whose movements became more synchronized
(Figure 3). Foreign shareholding in the stock market
also increased substantially (Figure 6).
These are indications that the integration of the
economy into the global economy proceeded briskly
since 1993. However, domestic institutions and mar-
ket infrastructure lagged behind.  Domestic competi-
tion policies, corporate governance structure, and
banking regulations were not adjusted concomitantly.
By the mid-1990s, the economy had outgrown its
own institutional capacity. As a result, it became in-
creasingly inefficient and vulnerable to changes in
the external economic environment.
Macroeconomic Policy Management
in the Midst of Globalization
Although it  pursued a sound macroeconomic policy,
the Government failed to address the economy’s
structural weakness which led to bubbles by the early
1990s.
The flawed competition policy, which allowed
cross-subsidy through various means, including trans-
fer pricing and cross-loan guarantees among affili-
ated firms, went unchecked. Small shareholders’ right
to monitor and check management efficiency was
blocked by, among others, poor accounting practices.
Financial sector’s poor credit analyses, moral haz-
ard nurtured under the past development strategy,
and poor prudential regulation and supervision facili-
tated the financial institutions’ reckless lending to risky
corporate investments. Demand for capital and la-
bor, however, continued to expand.
In the early 1990s, the economy was already show-
ing signs of growing structural distortions character-
ized by high wage levels, interest rates, rental costs,
and logistic costs. Nevertheless, corporate invest-
ments remained strong due to the distorted incentive
structure and unrealistic expectations, which were
left uncorrected during the fast-paced globalization
in 1993-1996.
Another area of Government oversight was man-
agement of the exchange rate policy. Although mac-
roeconomic policy in general was sound during the
period of globalization, exchange rate policy was
controversial. The economy showed signs of wan-
ing competitiveness; the current account deficit de-
teriorated sharply in 1996. The authorities should have
let the exchange rate slide as market forces started
Figure 6: Shareholding by Foreign Investors in
the Domestic Stock Market
Source: Korea Stock Exchange Website.
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to push down the currency’s value in the second half
of 1996. Instead, they tried to sustain the overvalued
exchange rate by intervening in the market at the
cost of about $17 billion (Figure 7).11
Government motives for intervening were to (i)
stave off the inflationary impact of depreciation and
(ii) limit exchange losses of heavily indebted chaebol.
But considering the large current account deficit and
relatively small foreign reserves, it does not seem to
be the right policy response.
Inconsistency of Macroeconomic
Policies
In a broad sense, the country’s financial and cur-
rency crisis resulted from its failure to reform its in-
stitutions to match the economy’s growing openness
to and integration into the global market. Rapid eco-
nomic growth since the 1960s made the economy
and private sector sophisticated enough so that Gov-
ernment intervention in resource allocation was no
longer efficient or effective. Thus, economic liberal-
ization was the correct policy response. However, to
some extent, it was driven by both internal and ex-
ternal pressures. The external pressure to liberalize
trade and open the capital market came from the
establishment of the WTO and continuing trade dis-
putes with the Western economies. Since Korea al-
ready had relatively low tariff rates of around 6-7
percent, trade liberalization focused on reducing
nontariff barriers and deregulating foreign direct in-
vestment in areas such as distribution and retail trade.
The greatest pressure was on financial market open-
ing. It came not only from external sources, but also
from the chaebol, whose operations had been glo-
balized.
Financial liberalization, however, was not accom-
panied by the necessary reform of firms and finan-
cial institutions. The uneven competition policy and
lax prudential regulations remained intact. Although
economic liberalization was an appropriate policy
response to the changing internal and external envi-
ronments, it emboldened domestic firms and finan-
cial institutions to explore tremendous moral-hazard
opportunities. In the past, moral hazard had been
partly offset by regulations such as entry restrictions
and controls on internal and external borrowing.
During the deregulation drive, the Government should
have implemented institutional reforms in competi-
tion policies,  prudential regulatory framework, and
the labor market.
At the macroeconomic level, overemphasis on
price stability when the currency was overvalued
prevented currency depreciation, further eroding
Korean exports’ competitiveness and fueling specu-
lation on the currency’s future depreciation.
Macroeconomic Policy
Management During the Crisis
The accumulated impact of structural weaknesses
started to surface in early 1997. For example, Hanbo,
which had swiftly expanded in real estate and con-
struction of residential buildings, moved into the steel
mill business and invested heavily by raising short-
term debt. When its cash flow was squeezed by the
domestic recession, it could no longer repay its loans
and went bankrupt in January 1997. Six of the 30
largest chaebol followed suit. Kia, one of the three
major automakers, and the ninth largest chaebol, de-
faulted in July.
The Government let them go bankrupt as it could
no longer intervene in the credit market or through
Figure 7: Intervention in the Foreign Exchange
Market ($ billion)
Source: Maeil Business Newspaper.
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monetary expansion. However, with the presidential
election at the end of the year, political circles pres-
sured the Government to prevent the massive bank-
ruptcy. A “cooperative creditors group” was estab-
lished, including banks and merchant banks, to pro-
vide rescue loans to financially troubled chaebol,
which only postponed the bankruptcies but could not
save the firms. The Government was politically pres-
sured not to let Kia fail or be merged, for example.
When Kia could no longer be supported by a rescue
loan, it finally went bankrupt in October 1997. For-
eign investors’ confidence in the Government was
eroded, especially when it announced that it would
become a major shareholder of Kia by converting
the Government-owned Korea Development Bank’s
loans to equity capital of the company.
As corporate insolvency increased, so did banks’
nonperforming assets. Banks, especially merchant
banks, were the main channel of foreign loans. When
their nonperforming assets became increasingly con-
spicuous, foreign creditors expected the Government
to recapitalize the banks or close down those with no
hope of recovery. Instead, the Government came up
with a scheme that would obviously not cure the prob-
lem. On 25 August 1997, as the corporate and finan-
cial sectors’ difficulties mounted, the Government
promised to financially support troubled banks and to
ensure that Korean financial institutions’ foreign debt
liabilities would be repaid. It also required financial
institutions to submit three- to five-year restructur-
ing plans. These measures did little to reassure the
market. With the failure of the National Assembly to
pass bills based on the recommendations of the Presi-
dential Commission on Financial Sector Reform, for-
eign investors’ confidence was eroded even further,
dimming long-term economic prospects.
When the Thailand crisis broke out, foreign inves-
tors’ confidence was practically nil. The crisis un-
derscored other East Asian countries’ vulnerability,
notably their (i) macroeconomic instability, (ii) finan-
cial weakness, (iii) political volatility, (iv) wavering
commitment to reform, and (v) unclear future. How-
ever, the Government failed to restructure the finan-
cial sector or introduce reforms to strengthen the
economy. The Ministry of Finance and Economy and
the Bank of Korea had long battled over monetary
policy and banking supervision in the new financial
reform package.  The Government’s way of han-
dling the Kia problem and financial restructuring is-
sues disappointed foreign investors. The upcoming
presidential election added to the uncertainty.
Although the possibility of a currency crisis be-
came evident in late October, the Government still
did not take decisive action. The pressure on the won
intensified. Instead of increasing domestic interest
rates, the authorities defended the currency  and used
foreign reserves to prevent the default of Korean
banks’ foreign branches and of merchant banks
whose short-term debts were no longer being re-
volved. They also maintained a loose monetary policy
to support rescue loans by financial institutions. The
intervention plunged usable foreign exchange re-
serves to below $10 billion, or less than a month’s
imports (Table 16). Speculation that the authorities
had depleted the country’s foreign reserves triggered
the currency’s free fall.
1997 1998
Item Dec 1996 Mar Jun Sep Dec Mar Jun Jul
Deposits at overseas branch 3.8 8.0 8.0 8.0 11.3 5.4 3.7 3.6
Usable foreign reserves 29.4 21.1 25.3 22.4 8.9 24.2 37.0 39.3
Others 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Total official foreign reserves 33.2 29.2 33.3 30.4 20.4 29.8 40.9 43.0
Table 16: Official Foreign Exchange Reserves, End of Quarter, 1996-1998 ($ billion)
a Based on IMF definition.
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy, Financial Statistics Bulletin, various issues.
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On 19 November, the Government announced
another set of policy measures to deal with the mount-
ing financial crisis: (i) increased funding to deal with
nonperforming assets of financial institutions, (ii) fur-
ther liberalization of capital account transactions, and
(iii) enhanced disclosure standards and loan classifi-
cation requirements. This failed to calm the markets.
On the same day, the authorities declared that the
daily exchange rate band had been widened to plus
and minus 10 percent, and that they would cease to
intervene. The won continued its free fall. From late
November to December, the won depreciated more
than 50 percent against the dollar. The Government
asked the Japanese and US Governments for res-
cue support, but without success. On 21 November,
it formally requested the IMF for bailout credit.
In retrospect, the Government had no options left
but to let the won depreciate, tighten its monetary
policy, and ask for IMF assistance. However, the
situation has already worsened as the Government
attempted in vain to avert the crisis by intervening in
the exchange market until foreign reserves were al-
most completely depleted.
The IMF Program
and Assessment
The IMF Program
The Government began to implement the IMF pro-
gram in December 1997. Since then, IMF has fre-
quently reviewed the economy’s performance and
adjusted the program several times. The IMF pro-
gram consists of two parts: macroeconomic adjust-
ment and structural reform. Macroeconomic adjust-
ment means tightening the fiscal stance and sharply
raising domestic interest rates. Initially, IMF required
the authorities to keep a fiscal balance or maximum
deficit of 0.8 percent of GDP, and a tight monetary
policy. Interest rates were drastically increased; call
market rate rose monthly from an average of 14.1
percent in November 1997 to 21.6 percent in De-
cember 1997 and 25.6 percent in  January 1998; cor-
porate bond yield also went up from 14.1 to 24.3 and
23.4 percent for the same period.
On top of the shock caused by the currency crisis,
the tight fiscal and monetary stance led to a dramatic
fall in investment and consumer confidence.  The
economy contracted sharply, with investment plung-
ing about 30 percent and import demand about 25 per-
cent in the first half of 1998. Unemployment went up
from 2.1 percent in October 1997 to 7 percent in June
1998. Official projection for economic growth in 1998
was -4 percent, but the actual growth rate was even
lower at -5.5 percent. In the review of July 1998, IMF
changed its position on macroeconomic policy and
suggested that the fiscal deficit be expanded drasti-
cally to prevent too-fast economic contraction. The
Government set a deficit of up to 4 percent. Interest
rates have gradually declined since February 1998,
and as the exchange rate further stabilized, they have
settled at near precrisis levels (Table 17).
The structural adjustment part of the IMF program
focuses on four areas: (i) trade liberalization, (ii) capi-
tal market opening and liberalization of foreign ex-
change control, (iii) corporate restructuring, and
(iv) financial sector restructuring (see Appendix).
Indicator
Corporate bond yield (%)
Call rate (%)
Exchange rate (W/$)
Unemployment rate (%)
Current account ($ million)
Table 17: Macroeconomic Developments After the Crisis
(  ) = negative values are enclosed in parentheses.
Source: Bank of  Korea, Monthly Bulletin, various issues.
Jan
23.4
25.6
1,707
4.5
3,060
Feb
19.8
23.5
1,623
5.9
3,994
Mar
19.0
22.6
1,505
6.5
3,629
Apr
18.1
21.2
1,392
6.7
3,859
May
17.9
18.5
1,395
6.9
4,262
Jun
16.6
16.3
1,397
7.0
3,434
Jul
11.9
11.4
891
2.2
(1,045)
Aug
12.1
12.5
896
2.1
(498)
Sep
12.4
13.3
909
2.2
(510)
Oct
12.5
13.6
922
2.1
(488)
Nov
14.1
14.1
1,026
2.6
864
Dec
24.3
21.6
1,484
3.1
3,585
1997 1998
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A timetable for trade liberalization was set in line
with the WTO commitment to eliminate (i) trade-
related subsidies, (ii) restrictive import licensing, and
(iii) the import diversification program.
Regarding capital account liberalization, the Gov-
ernment took the following measures:
• Increased the ceiling on aggregate foreign own-
ership of listed shares from 26 to 55 percent and
eliminated the ceiling completely by end-1998.
• Raised individual foreign ownership from 7 to
50 percent.
• Immediately removed restrictions on foreign
access to domestic money market instruments
and the corporate bond market.
• Set a timetable to eliminate all remaining restric-
tions on corporate borrowings, including loans
with one- to three-year maturities, by end-1998.
To restructure the corporate sector, the Govern-
ment must complete the following key tasks:
• Improve the corporate governance structure by
removing restrictions on institutional investors’
voting rights in listed companies.
• Strengthen minority shareholders’ rights.
• Increase transparency of corporate accounting
practice by requiring publication of consolidated
financial statements for affiliated firms.
• Reduce cross-guarantees among affiliated firms.
• Liberalize domestic mergers and acquisitions by
eliminating the mandatory tender offer require-
ment.
To facilitate financial restructuring, the Govern-
ment has established the conditions necessary to (i)
accelerate the exit of insolvent banks, (ii) rehabili-
tate troubled banks, and (iii) strengthen prudential
regulations.
Assessment of the IMF Program
Overall, the IMF program is reasonable. IMF has been
flexible, adjusting the program according to develop-
ments in the economy. At first, it might not have fully
understood the economy, but it soon came to better
understand the situation of firms and financial institu-
tions. This, together with domestic and foreign criti-
cisms, contributed to the program’s flexibility.
Initially, the IMF program had some problems.
Facing a currency crisis, the country needed to sub-
stantially improve its current account position
through tight aggregate demand control, as IMF sug-
gested. But as Table 17 shows, the economy was
already contracting fast, its fiscal position was
sound, and the current account started to turn to
surplus in November 1997, when the currency cri-
sis was about to break out. Thus the fiscal stance
did not need additional tightening. Another prob-
lematic issue was the high interest rate policy. When
the IMF program started in December 1997, the
foreign exchange market was extremely unstable;
a high interest rate policy was inevitable. But it is
debatable whether increasing the interest rate to
such a high level  and sustaining it for such a long
period was appropriate.
The financial crisis was caused by widespread
corporate insolvency and the resulting rise in banks’
nonperforming assets. Korean firms’ debt/equity ra-
tio has always been much higher than that of firms in
other countries. It is estimated that, at the end of
1997, the largest 30 chaebol’s average debt/equity
ratio was over 500 percent. If they did their account-
ing based on the consolidated balance sheet, then
the actual ratio was much higher. The interest rate
increase was thus a very costly measure in Korea.
It would inevitably lead to massive bankruptcies,
which, in turn, would cause financial institutions’
nonperforming loans to snowball, further eroding for-
eign creditors’ confidence that the economy would
recover.
Although the high interest rate policy had its mer-
its in stabilizing the foreign exchange market, its costs
seemed to have outweighed its benefits for several
reasons:
• Under conditions of great uncertainty and fail-
ure of confidence, high interest rates could not
be expected to attract substantial foreign capital
inflow.12
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• The country’s foreign exchange control limited
capital flight.
• Such high corporate debt/equity ratio and high
interest rate policy intimidated potential foreign
investors.
Although high interest rates were inevitable in the
first several weeks, the IMF program could have
chosen to reduce interest rates more quickly which
would have kept down the banks’ nonperforming
assets.
The IMF program may also be criticized for com-
pletely eliminating restrictions on foreign investment
in domestic money market instruments and in Gov-
ernment and corporate bonds. Opening the market
could not attract the very foreign investors who had
lost confidence in the Government. But the same
policy would burden the economy once the foreign
investors’ confidence returned and massive short-
term capital flowed in. Although the policy has not
harmed the economy so far, one may question why
IMF had insisted on it.
IMF recently recommended a drastic increase
in the fiscal deficit, which is understandable con-
sidering the economy’s sharp contraction. But if the
country is to regain foreign confidence, it must have
a large current account surplus, which means that
the Government must continue to control demand
as export prospects are poor. The Government also
needs to provide a huge fund for restructuring ail-
ing banks, even at the expense of medium- and long-
term fiscal soundness. It is not clear why IMF rec-
ommended a sharp increase in the fiscal deficit,
which it has rarely done in other countries. IMF
may be responsible for preventing a too-sharp con-
traction of the Asian economies in order to avoid
worldwide recession, but its turnaround after the
G-7 deputy ministerial meeting in Tokyo, which
agreed to boost the Asian economies, can give rise
to the thought that IMF considers the advanced eco-
nomies’ interests more important than the program
countries’ long-term fiscal viability and structural
adjustment.
IMF’s structural adjustment measures, however,
are appropriate, although it would be better if the
program strengthened tax administration and liberal-
ized land policy. Poor tax administration allows wide-
spread tax evasion, which limits tax revenue and
raises the unfairness of the tax incidence. The Gov-
ernment needs more fiscal expenditures in order to
(i) restructure the financial sector, (ii) ease the bottle-
neck of social infrastructure, and (iii) establish social
safety nets. Unless tax administration is strength-
ened and tax revenue increased, the country may
find itself caught in a vicious circle of chronic fiscal
deficit.
The program could also have liberalized land
policy. Restrictions on land use resulted in extremely
high land prices and rents, which increased the cost
of production and cost of living, which, in turn, pro-
pelled high wages (Cho 1998). If, for instance, the
Government were to release about 10 percent of the
land earmarked for agricultural use, it would almost
double the supply of residential land.
Challenges Facing the
Korean Economy
The Korean economy faces a difficult situation. The
Government must perform two tasks: (i) resolve fi-
nancial sector problems, i.e., clean up losses already
incurred; and (ii) reduce the structural problems dis-
cussed above as well as establish new rules and in-
stitutions to prevent further deterioration of the cor-
porate environment.
Resolving Financial Sector Problems
The country’s financial sector problems were deep
and widespread. They are not limited to banks and
merchant banks, but also seriously affect other fi-
nancial institutions, including investment and trust
companies; securities firms; leasing, insurance, mu-
tual savings, and finance companies; and credit
unions. At the core of the financial sector problem is
corporate insolvency. In early 1998, nonperforming
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assets were estimated at about 20 percent of finan-
cial institutions’ total assets. The financial sector is
large compared to GDP. Total domestic credit is
about 170 percent of annual GDP, implying that
nonperforming assets could be more than one third
of GDP. Since domestic financial institutions cannot
immediately expect substantial foreign investment,
and the prospects for raising domestic capital are
poor, the Government should provide the resources
needed to solve the problem. Otherwise, the credit
squeeze and market uncertainty will continue to pre-
vent economic recovery. The Government is com-
mitted to contribute about W60 trillion to W70 trillion
(about 15 percent of GDP), but this amount is far too
small to complete the financial restructuring.
The Government must improve the corporate fi-
nancial structure. Financial restructuring cannot suc-
ceed without corporate debt restructuring. Unless
the corporate debt ratio is substantially reduced, fi-
nancial instability will recur, and resources used to
recapitalize the banks will be wasted. The high debt/
equity ratio will prevent the country from shifting to
a fully market-based financial system. The Govern-
ment will be forced to continue bailing out troubled
firms. Without converting corporate debt into equity,
the corporate debt ratio cannot be improved. The
Government should, therefore, orchestrate a large-
scale debt-to-equity conversion. It should also re-
structure the financial market; only then can the cor-
porate financial structure be changed. The specifics
of the required policies are not explained here. But
the equity market has to expand rapidly with the es-
tablishment of mutual funds, which can facilitate the
conversion of debt to equity. Initially, the Govern-
ment should support or contribute capital directly to
the funds since they may face liquidity problems in
the transition period.
Resolving Structural Distortions
Structural problems include (i) distorted relative
prices, such as high exchange rate, real wages, rental
cost, and interest rates; and (ii) a misguided incen-
tive structure, which led to overinvestment and firms’
overly leveraged financial structure. The first prob-
lem has been addressed: (i) the overvalued exchange
rate has been corrected, (ii) real wages are going
down fast, and (iii) property values and rents are
gradually declining. Interest rates were very high for
a while, but they have settled at near precrisis levels.
Relative prices have substantially improved. Although
the sharp contraction in domestic demand caused
severe cash flow problems, firms’ cost structure and
export competitiveness have much improved.
However, structural reforms have been delayed.
The Government has set a timetable to improve the
corporate governance structure, accounting stan-
dards, and competition policies. Although some
progress has been made in these areas, a clearer
and comprehensive plan is yet to be established. It is
important that the Government continue to implement
the IMF measures on schedule and to strictly en-
force the new rules.
Lessons and Concluding
Remarks
A combination of factors caused the country’s fi-
nancial and currency crisis. The Southeast Asian fi-
nancial contagion was the immediate cause, but
Korea’s own longstanding structural problems, which
were incompatible with the liberalized and globalized
market environment, were the fundamental causes.
The Korean crisis was inevitable in the wake of rapid
economic liberalization and opening of the highly regu-
lated economy. The economy has outgrown the old
institutions and rules of the game which served it
well in the period of rapid economic growth. On top
of this were oversight in prudential regulation caused
by (i) lack of regulatory responsibility and (ii)  inabil-
ity to check and quickly respond to problems which
were, in turn, due to (a) frequent replacement of
persons responsible for implementing the policy and
(b) inadequate policy response as the crisis ap-
proached.13
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Macroeconomic policy was reasonably sound and
macroeconomic performance impressive. But the
country had to face the consequences of its failure
to deal with longstanding structural problems in rap-
idly changing internal and external environments. Fi-
nancial liberalization made corporate financial struc-
ture vulnerable as firms increasingly relied on short-
term debt. Liberalization of capital transactions, es-
pecially of short-term trade credit and bank loans,
led to growing term mismatch of banks’ foreign as-
sets and liabilities. The regulatory authorities failed
to check these developments. In sum, the crisis was
caused by the failure to adopt necessary structural
reforms and enhance monitoring and supervisory
capacity.
The lessons from the financial and currency crisis
are summarized below:
• Capital market opening and integration of the
domestic into the international capital market
weakened the economy because it was already
fraught with structural problems. To survive in
the international capital market, countries must
have not only macroeconomic discipline but also
a sound microeconomic foundation. It is risky to
fully liberalize domestic financial institutions when
their assets are of doubtful quality. In other words,
a country about to open its financial market should
immediately address its banking and corporate
sector problems.
• Even though a country may take a cautious ap-
proach to capital market opening, it may face a
currency crisis if it does not monitor and regu-
late the foreign asset and liability structure of its
financial institutions. The Government thought it
had been cautious: it restricted foreign invest-
ment in the domestic securities market in order
to limit volatile short-term capital flows, but it did
not foresee a crisis due to foreign creditors’ re-
fusal to revolve short-term credit to domestic
banks. An immediate cause of the currency cri-
sis was the failure to check the term mismatch
of financial institutions’ foreign assets and liabili-
ties.
• A sustained high interest policy was not a desir-
able response to simultaneous currency and bank-
ing crises. When an economy loses the confi-
dence of foreign investors and creditors and faces
a currency crisis, a sharp hike of domestic inter-
est rates is the surest way to discourage foreign
investment. Although a policy of temporarily high
interest rates may prevent massive capital out-
flow and exchange depreciation, it is costly. Al-
ternatives are (a) implementing temporary ex-
change control or (b) postponing exchange con-
trol while keeping interest rates at a moderate
level. A country in severe financial and currency
crisis suffers a sharp fall in domestic investment
and consumption demand. High interest rates
increase banks’ nonperforming assets, raise the
ultimate cost of financial restructuring, and dis-
courage potential foreign investors. Korea might
have done better if it had maintained exchange
control on the outflow side for a while (to pre-
vent capital flight or conversion of deposits into
dollars) and lowered interest rates. Then the in-
ternational community may have helped resched-
ule short-term debt.
The Korean economy is going through a process
of comprehensive economic adjustment under the
IMF program. The speed of its recovery from the
crisis will depend on how quickly the authorities deal
with the structural root causes of its financial and
corporate sector problems and with the external eco-
nomic environment. The challenges facing the
economy are as formidable as its financial and long-
standing structural problems.
20 A STUDY OF FINANCIAL MARKETS
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
Notes
1$21 billion from the IMF, $10 billion from the World Bank,
$4 billion from the Asian Development Bank, and the rest
from bilateral loans.
2See Cho and Kim (1995) for details of financial sector
policies and the industrialization process.
3See Cho and Hellman (1993).
4See Cho and Kim (1995) for a comprehensive discussion
of Korean credit policy and industrialization.
5See Cho and Kim (1995).
6See Cho (1998) for a more detailed analysis of structural
problems.
7Firms are allowed periodic revaluation of their assets.
8Rivalry among chaebol was a factor that caused com-
petitive entry into certain key industries, such as automo-
biles, contributing to overcapacity build-up.
9Until recently, the monetary aggregates subject to con-
trol by the monetary authority were M2 and M2 plus cer-
tificate of deposits which did not include CP.
10Strong foreign pressure, especially from the US, and
Korea’s ambition to join OECD forced the Government
to accelerate the deregulation of foreign equity invest-
ment.
11Maeil Business Newspaper.
12High interest rates attracted little foreign investment in
domestic fixed-income assets.
13In 1995-1997, six director-generals in charge of the In-
ternational Banking and Finance Department of the Min-
istry of Finance and Economy were replaced.
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Appendix
Financial Liberalization in the 1990s
Liberalization of Interest Rates
The Government announced a four-stage plan
for interest rate deregulation in 1991. In the first
stage, most of the short-term lending rates of banks
and nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs) were de-
regulated, while deposit rate liberalization extended
only to deposits with maturities of at least three
years. Interest rates on various money and capital
market instruments, including issue rate on corpo-
rate bonds with maturities of over two years, were
also liberalized.
The second stage, undertaken in 1993, covered
all lending rates of banks and NBFIs, excluding loans
financed by the Government or by the Bank of
Korea’s (BOK’s) rediscounts. It also freed long-term
deposit rates with maturities of two years or more,
and the issue rates of all bonds, including financial
debentures.
Part of the third stage was implemented ahead of
schedule in 1994 (instead of 1995) when the mini-
mum maturities of certificates of deposits (CDs),
large-value repurchase agreements (RPs), and com-
mercial paper (CP) were shortened.  At the same
time, rates on deposits with maturities of at least one
year and rates on loans refinanced by BOK were
liberalized. In 1995, rates on loans supported by the
central bank’s rediscounts were completely freed up,
and deregulation of rates was extended to all depos-
its except demand deposits.
The last phase of the plan was implemented in
July 1997.  Currently, all lending rates and most rates
on deposits apart from demand deposits are deter-
mined freely by financial institutions themselves.
Reduction of Entry Barriers
Entry barriers and restriction on business scope have
also been steadily eased.  Furthermore, the legal and
institutional environment has been improved in order
to encourage mergers of financial institutions.
Under the Act Concerning the Merger and Con-
version of Financial Institutions in 1991, eight invest-
ment and finance companies were converted into
five securities companies and two nationwide com-
mercial banks—Hana Bank and Boram Bank. Peace
Bank, the 14th largest nationwide commercial bank,
was established in 1992.  Provincial investment and
finance companies were allowed to convert them-
selves into merchant banking corporations in 1994.
The Citizens National Bank, a specialized bank, be-
came a nationwide commercial bank and was re-
named Kookmin Bank in 1995.
Strengthening Managerial Autonomy
Financial institutions now exercise managerial
autonomy and are free to (i) select their chief ex-
ecutive officers, (ii) increase their capital, (iii) set
dividends, and (iv) establish branches.
Business areas handled by financial institutions
were enlarged.  In 1990, banks’ securities business
was expanded to include sales of corporate bonds
under repurchase agreements.  Banks were allowed
to act as lead underwriters for Government and pub-
lic bonds in 1993, and to sell “cover bills,” issued on
the basis of underlying primary bills, in 1994. Banks
and life insurance companies were permitted to sell
Government and public bonds over-the-counter while
securities companies were authorized to handle for-
eign exchange business within certain limits in 1995.
To promote financial intermediaries’ autonomous
operation of their funds, policy-based loans to specific
sectors, such as export industries and small and me-
dium enterprises, have been phased out. The overall
credit control system, which requires that the ratio of
a bank’s loans to major business groups to its total
loans does not exceed the ratio set by the Superinten-
dent of Banks, has also been greatly streamlined.
Liberalization of Foreign Exchange
A major step forward in foreign exchange liberal-
ization was the introduction of a market average for-
eign exchange rate system in March 1990. It was
22 A STUDY OF FINANCIAL MARKETS
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
adopted to eliminate any arbitrary Government influ-
ence in the determination of foreign exchange rates.
Under the system, the exchange rate of the won
against the dollar (market average rate) was deter-
mined by the weighted average of the interbank ex-
change rates applied in interbank spot transactions
of the previous business day.  The won exchange
rates against foreign currencies other than the dollar
were arrived at by arbitrating between the dollar rates
of foreign currencies in the international markets and
the market average rate.
On 1 July 1991, the Government eased the re-
quirement that foreign exchange transactions be sup-
ported by documented underlying real demand.  The
move was meant to reduce exchange risk and de-
velop the foreign exchange market.
A foreign currency call market was set up in De-
cember 1989, initially for trading only in dollars.  It
was expanded to include the yen in March 1991, the
deutsche mark in September 1992, and the UK pound
sterling in November 1994.
In a particularly significant development, a com-
pletely revised Foreign Exchange Management Act
was passed in December 1991, changing the basis
for regulation from a positive to a negative system.
Under the positive system, all transactions, apart from
those expressly permitted by law, were prohibited.
In contrast, under the negative system, all activities
are permitted except those explicitly prohibited by
law.  The adoption of the negative system facilitated
the elimination of many restrictions.
Progress was also made in the internationaliza-
tion of the won.  Won settlement was allowed to a
certain extent for the export or import of visible items.
“Free won” accounts for nonresidents were intro-
duced in 1993.
In June 1994, the Government took another step
toward full foreign exchange liberalization. It trimmed
the negative list for current transactions and also fa-
cilitated direct outward investment. The Foreign Ex-
change Reform Plan unveiled by the Government in
December 1994 laid out a detailed schedule for
(i) decontrol of current account transactions, (ii) lib-
eralization of capital account transactions, and
(iii) reform of the foreign exchange market struc-
ture, among others. As the key macroeconomic indi-
cators, such as money supply and exchange rate,
remained stable during the first phase of the plan,
the Government revised and supplemented the plan
to intensify its promotion of economic globalization
in November 1995.
The Government further accelerated financial
market opening when it joined the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
For instance, it had scheduled liberalization of for-
eign exchange and capital account transactions to
the level of advanced countries by 1999. Under the
IMF program, however, it abolished capital control.
Capital Market Opening
In the 1990s, capital market opening was acceler-
ated. Branches of foreign securities companies and
joint venture securities companies were permitted
on a reciprocal basis in 1991, while greater access
was given to international investment company funds,
and major Korean companies were allowed to un-
dertake more issues of convertible bonds and similar
securities overseas.
Beginning 16 September 1991, nonresidents who
had exchanged convertible bonds into stocks were per-
mitted to sell them and use the proceeds to purchase
other stocks listed on the Korea Stock Exchange.
Domestic institutional investors were also allowed to
invest in securities issued by foreign governments and
public organizations with a high credit standing. Secu-
rities investment trust business and investment advis-
ing were opened to foreigners in 1993.
Most notably, the stock market was liberalized.
Foreign investors were allowed to invest directly in
Korean stocks in 1992, subject to a general ceiling on
total foreign holdings of any one company’s outstand-
ing shares. The ceiling was raised several times until
it reached 55 percent at end-1997, and it was finally
abolished by end-1998, according to the IMF program.
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The opening of the bond market has been rather
slow due to the large gap between domestic and in-
ternational interest rates. In 1994, foreigners were
permitted to purchase Government and public bonds
issued at international interest rates in the primary
market and equity-linked bonds issued by small and
medium-size enterprises. Bond investment funds
were set up in 1995 to give foreign investors greater
indirect access to the bond market.
To counterbalance the opening of the domestic
market, residents were allowed to invest in overseas
securities indirectly through beneficiary certificates
in 1993, and the ceiling on domestic institutional in-
vestors’ overseas portfolio investment was abolished
in 1995.
International organizations were permitted to issue
won-denominated bonds in the domestic market in
1995. In January 1997, foreigners were allowed to
purchase nonguaranteed long-term bonds issued by
small- and medium-size enterprises, and, in June,
nonguaranteed convertible bonds issued by large com-
panies.  In December, the opening of the bond market
was accelerated under the IMF program. The ceiling
on foreign holdings of bonds, including corporate and
Government bonds, was abolished on 30 December.
Entry of Foreign Financial Institutions
Foreign bank branches increased rapidly in num-
ber and scale during the 1970s and 1980s, due partly
to their economic advantage over domestic commer-
cial banks. As of 1998, there were 68 foreign bank
branches and 23 representative offices from 19 coun-
tries in Korea.
The Government originally encouraged the entry
of foreign banks mainly to promote the inflow of for-
eign capital needed to finance industrial development
and the current account deficit. However, as the
importance of foreign capital inducement has de-
creased in recent years, foreign banks are expected
to take on increasingly diverse roles, including that
of an innovator introducing advanced banking tech-
niques into the Korean financial sector.
Discriminatory restrictions on operations of for-
eign bank branches have been progressively scaled
back. Foreign banks can expand their lending if the
Government authorizes increases in their operating
funds, upon which lending limitations are based. The
upper limit on their “capital A funds” was abolished
in May 1991.
Foreign banks have also been granted access to
the central bank’s rediscount window on the same
terms as domestic banks, and permitted to issue ne-
gotiable CDs and to engage in the trust business.
The ceiling on CD issue, which was gradually raised
in September 1986, was finally phased out in Febru-
ary 1997.
BOK has continuously eliminated discrimination
against foreign banks in the call market. Along with
this, it has also been reducing special privileges given
to foreign banks. It gradually decreased the ceiling
on swap facilities in 1986 and stopped granting them
to foreign bank branches established after 1988. In
1996, it further lowered the ceiling on swap facilities
by 10 percent. All preferential treatment will be abol-
ished in the long term.
In March 1985, the Monetary Board stipulated
that foreign banks should extend at least 25 percent
of the increment in their won lending of banking funds
to small and medium-sized firms. For foreign banks
that use the central bank’s rediscount facilities for
commercial bills, the mandatory ratio was increased
to 35 percent in August 1986.
Foreign banks are allowed to compete with domestic
banks on an equal footing. The economic-needs test,
once used to evaluate foreign financial institutions’
branch opening applications, was abolished.
Two or more branches operated by a single for-
eign bank are deemed a single entity within the mean-
ing of the General Banking Act of 1991. Foreign banks
with multiple branches were thus given much greater
flexibility in their business, such as in management
of CD issuance within the authorized limits. Foreign
banks and securities companies can set up subsid-
iaries in Korea beginning March 1998.
24 A STUDY OF FINANCIAL MARKETS
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
Date of
Program
3 Dec
1997
7 Feb
1998
2 May
29 July
Table A1: Macroeconomic Conditions Under the IMF Program
Fiscal Deficit
(% of GDP)
0.8 or
Small surplus
0.8
1.2 (1.75 will
be permitted)
4.0
Money Growth (M3)
(W trillion)
(% change year-on-year)
71 at end-Dec 1997
(Reduction from  an estimated
16.4% at end- Sept 1997 to
15.4% at end-Dec 1997, and to a
rate consistent with the inflation
objective in 1998)
72 in the first quarter of 1998
(13.5%)
75 in the second quarter (14.1%)
77 in the third quarter (13.9%)
79 in the fourth quarter (12.5%)
Same as in February
78 in the third quarter of 1998
(14.0%)
79 in the fourth quarter (13.5%)
Current
Account
($ billion )
4.3 (1.0% of
GDP) in 1998
2.1 (0.5% of
GDP) in 1999
8 (2.5% of
GDP)
21-23 (7% of
GDP)
33-35
Foreign
Reserve
($ billion)
21
(End-Sep 1998)
30 (End-Dec 1998)
32 (end-June 1998)
34 (end-Sep)
41 (end-Dec)
End-Dec target
is same as that of
May (but projected
to be 43)
Inflation
(%)
5.0
(1998)
4.6
(1999)
9.0
below
double
digits by
yearend
9.0
GDP
Growth
Rate (%)
3.0 (1998)
5.6 (1999)
1.0 (zero
or negative
growth is
possible )
1.0
4.0
Structural Reform Measures
INITIAL PROGRAM: DECEMBER 1997
Trade Liberalization
A timetable will be set in line with World Trade
Organization commitments to eliminate (i) trade-re-
lated subsidies, (ii) restrictive import licensing, and
(iii) the import diversification program. Steps will be
taken to streamline and improve the transparency of
import certification procedures.
Capital Account Liberalization
Foreign financial institutions will be allowed to par-
ticipate in mergers and acquisitions of domestic fi-
nancial institutions in a friendly manner and on equal
footing. By mid-1998, foreign financial institutions will
be allowed to establish bank subsidiaries and broker-
age houses.
Legislation will be submitted to the first special
session of the National Assembly to harmonize the
regime on equity purchases with OECD practice.
The ceiling on aggregate foreign ownership of
listed Korean shares will be increased from 26 to 50
percent by end-1997 and to 55 percent by end-1998.
The ceiling on individual foreign ownership will be
increased from 7 to 50 percent by end-1997.
By end-February 1998, other capital account trans-
actions will be liberalized by (i) easing foreigners’
access to domestic money market instruments and
the corporate bond market and (ii) simplifying the
approval procedure for foreign direct investment.
A timetable will be set by end-February 1998 to
eliminate restrictions on foreign borrowing by corpo-
rations.
Corporate Restructuring
Corporate balance sheet transparency will be im-
proved by enforcing accounting standards in line with
generally accepted accounting practices. The com-
mercial orientation of bank lending will be fully re-
spected and the Government will not intervene in bank
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy.
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management and lending decisions. To strengthen
market discipline, bankruptcy laws will be allowed to
operate without Government interference.
The “real name” system in financial transactions
will be maintained, although with possible revisions.
By late 1998, the restructuring of corporate finances
will be encouraged by, among others, (i) reducing
the high debt-to-equity ratio of corporations and (ii)
changing the system of cross-guarantees within con-
glomerates.
Financial Sector Restructuring
 Legislation will be enacted to (i) set up a strong
and independent supervisory agency, (ii) strengthen
and consolidate prudential supervision, and (iii) in-
crease transparency.
Time-bound action plans will ensure that there will
be (i) an orderly exit of nonviable institutions, (ii) pro-
cedures and policies to deal with weak but viable
financial institutions, and (iii) measures to improve
the commercial orientation and risk management of
the financial sector.
The National Assembly should pass the following:
• A revised Bank of Korea Act, providing for cen-
tral bank independence, with price stability as its
main mandate.
• A bill to consolidate supervision of all banks,
merchant banks, securities firms, and insurance
companies into one agency with operational and
financial autonomy.
• A bill requiring that corporate financial statements
be prepared on a consolidated basis and certi-
fied by external auditors.
Troubled financial institutions will be restructured
and recapitalized within a specified time frame. The
exit strategy will (i) require troubled institutions to
present a viable rehabilitation plan and (ii) close
insolvent financial institutions and those failing to
carry out their rehabilitation plans within specified
periods.
Domestic and foreign institutions may engage in
mergers and acquisitions.
A timetable will be set for all banks to meet or
exceed Basle standards.
All forms of assistance to banks, including that
coursed through the Korean Asset Management
Corporation (KAMCO) and deposit insurance funds,
will be provided only as part of viable rehabilitation
plans.
Blanket guarantees will be phased out and replaced
by a limited deposit insurance scheme.
Merchant Banks
The foreign exchange operations of nine techni-
cally insolvent merchant banks will be transferred to
other institutions. (The banks were suspended on 2
December 1997, with depositors fully protected.)
The consolidated deposit insurance corporation will
issue bonds to raise the funds needed to meet the
deposit insurance obligation. The Government will
guarantee these bonds and bear the interest costs.
The Government announced that it would propose
amendments of laws to allow foreign financial insti-
tutions to participate in mergers and acquisitions of
domestic financial institutions. Foreign participation
in merchant banks is allowed up to 100 percent.
The Government did the following:
• It immediately placed the nine suspended mer-
chant banks under the control of the Ministry of
Finance and Economy (MOFE) and required
each to submit a rehabilitation plan within 30 days.
If MOFE fails to approve such plan, the institu-
tion will have its license revoked and will not be
eligible to participate in the KAMCO program
of bad-asset purchase or receive any financing
from the deposit insurance fund.
• It monitored the banks’ rehabilitation in close
consultation with IMF. If the head of the super-
visory authority concludes that rehabilitation has
not been successful within three months, the in-
stitution will be closed.
• It required the remaining merchant banks to
present by 31 December 1997 a program of re-
capitalization or downsizing that will allow them
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to meet at least a 4 percent capital requirement
ratio by 31 March 1998, 6 percent by 30 June
1998, and 8 percent by June 1999. Failure to ob-
tain supervisory approval of the program or to
meet the schedule will lead to suspension of their
foreign exchange business and possibly revoca-
tion of their license.
• It required the two distressed commercial banks
to prepare a plan to meet the Basle capital stan-
dard within four months after approval of the
plan. It required other commercial banks to make
full provisioning for their impaired assets and for
their securities losses by end-March 1998. The
banks will agree on a timetable with the supervi-
sory authority by June 1998 to achieve current
minimum capital standards within a time frame
of six months to two years.
• It required that the rehabilitation plans submitted
by financial institutions to supervisory authori-
ties should (i) specify  the sources and amounts
of new capital, a clear schedule to meet Basle
capital adequacy standards and provisioning re-
quirements, and confirmation from the supplier
of funds; (ii) indicate changes in management
and ownership; and (iii) present a business plan.
The Government proposes to do the following:
• In consultation with IMF, it will prepare a com-
prehensive action program to strengthen finan-
cial supervision and regulation in accordance with
international best-practice standards.
• It will subject specialized banks and development
institutions to the same prudential standards that
apply to commercial banks and require external
audit on their financial statements.
• It will closely monitor Korean banks’ overseas
branches’ borrowing and lending activities to
ensure that they are sound. New injections of
foreign exchange by BOK to Korean commer-
cial banks or their overseas branches will carry
a penalty rate of 400 basis points above the Lon-
don interbank offered rate. BOK’s deposits with
nonresident branches and affiliates of domestic
financial institutions will not be increased after
December 1997, but will be reduced gradually
as soon as circumstances permit.
• It will adjust the ceiling on net domestic assets
and the indicative limit on reserve money to com-
ply with required reserve ratios.
Limit
Outstanding stock (W trillion)
Net domestic assetsa
End-September,1997 1,721
End-December,1997 (performance criterion) 10,950
Percentage change 536%
Reserve money
End-September 1997 (actual) 22,275
End-December 1997 (indicative limit) 23,270
Percentage change 4.5%
Broad money (M3), 1996 614,961
End-September 1997 (projected) 688,760
End-December 1997 (indicative limit) 709,775
Percentage change (from 1996 to
end-Dec 1997) 15.4%
Table A2: Monetary Sector Indicators
a Net domestic assets are defined as the difference between reserve money and the
won equivalent  (converted at program exchange rates) of net adjusted
international reserves as defined in the program.
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy.
Item Floor ($ billion)
End-September 1997 (actual) 21.1
End-December 1997 (performance criterion) 11.2
Percentage change (46.9%)
Table A3: Net International Reserves of the
Bank of Korea
( ) = negative value
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy.
